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lN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------000---------------:;'J'!TTLER,

i T

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
P.L1TTY

Case No. 19156

CflWARDS STETTLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

----------------000---------------BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

----------------000---------------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court
refusiny to modify the Divorce Decree as to property
seltlement and refusing to grant the Defendant reimbursement
for money spent on the minor child in Defendant's custody
prior to the Hearing date.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant brought her Order To Show Cause To Modify the
Decree so as to require the Plaintiff to pay to her her equity
in the home upon Plaintiff's remarriage; to obtain contribution
from the Plaintiff for expenses incurred for support of the
p~1t1~s

minor child in her custody prior to the Hearing date

ar,d r'"r an award of child support for said minor child.
'I l1rc

r'ourt found that there was no change of circumstances

' ' 1rt

'"rd

tu j us ti fy the modification of the property
,icirccment, refused to require contribution on the

part of the Plaintiff for cxp<cn,;c:s <it
Plaintiff still had custody cc'.'
minor children,

dn,J m,

d

in Defendant's custudy

\

Cil1u

the

[)( f,
i

)l It

'c I

llLil

1<'1

I<d" 1

rt l'

the

,,]c],

Plaintiff's custody off-set each nth('r dnd,
ordered no support for those children.

!he

1 ,

The L'uu rt

the child support required to be paid by the Du,
the other minor child in Plaintiff's custody t·
DOLLARS

($75.00)

r. L

,,,,,

per month.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent respectfully requests the Cuurt t•
the decision of the lower Court in all

"'

respect~,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by the
Court of Davis County after sixteen
on August 26,

1981.

minor children,

STETTLER,
of age,

years cf

m~i:,,

The divorce to become final th,

months after date of entry
(3)

(16)

DL'

(Rp.12).

to-wit:

respectively,

The part1t>s lnJ

ROBERT CARL STETTLH,

und MATTHEW STETTLER,

who were 15,

w"'

(Rp .1).
At the time of the filing of the Cumr,lau,L '''
had been sc:parated fur appruximc1lcl\'

DcfcncJanL

1

s

inv()lvc·rn( ril

y.,,·1t_h

r_dU.St·,1
hr!

i

l r _,1

she met at her 1Jlacc of cmpl(1ymc,11t d!1d

·1 1

),'1
,1t ( 1

I

)c:'

l: ,ir,d"

at the time the Complaint

separation and divorce v..rci·L

c

1~ 1 • 1 1

-31,, •·•,ming fin.:ll

l •

in December of 1981 (Tp.10,

30).

"·mrJlaint being filed as a result of her

, ,, 11' "'' i lh her present husband, the Defendant left the
]":irt ies,

t Ji,

~1nu• cl
t

I"

and the Plaintiff and the minor children

li'.'e in the home.

\c;

At the time of the filing

,-,Jm1,laint the parties entered into a Stipulation (Rp .

... 1:, ·h Defendant reviewed and understood (Tp. 10).

Under

t[,,

t._·1ms of the Stipulation, Plaintiff was awarded the

. 11jt

,_,d; ,,f

lhe children and Defendant agreed to pay ONE

Ht ·:oc:r:o DOLLARS

($100. 00)

per month per child to assist with

•Cc.ire and agreed that Plaintiff be awarded the home and

':1•_ ll

: L.1l ->he be paid her share of the equity upon the sale of
h·.me or when the youngest child reached 18 years,
v.r.:·..:h .. v,·r occured first.
.1

IJcL'

Subsequently on August 26, 1981

"e of Divorce was entered by the Court incorporating

tr," t,_·ims of the Decree (Rp. 11).
l\1

thL· time of the Decree,

Defendant was employed at

11111 Air Furce Base in a very responsible position which
'--!Ult-··d her

to work with other people and carry out

s1qn1fi, ant management responsibilities (Tp. 32, 33).
In October of 1981 she quit her job and went to
,, ::1, v.·1th her present husband
Ii<

JI<

,

,·,.mf>Cr

tl1c·

of 1981

(Tp. 33) whom she later

(Tp. 10, 30).

·er1od from October 1981 to December 1981

11 I" l11nJ in child support
I,1

,

1

llL·c.!t· 1 ng,

(Tp. 18), and as of

there remained a balance owing to the

-4Plaintiff of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE ($875.00)
as stipulated by the parties (R}"

DOLL/\!<:

2'J).

In June of 1982 the parties' minor daughter wenl

1,

visit the Defendant (Tp. 12) and subsequently the parties
agreed that the best interest of the daughter would be

scr'.'e

by her permanent custody being transferred to the DefendaGt.
A Stipulation was signed transferring custody in November
of 1982 (Rp. 14) and the Order was signed by the Court on
December 3, 1982 (Rp. 16).
Since the date of separation until June 1982, Pla1ntir;
had the care and custody of the three

(3)

acted as both father and mother to them.

minor children an;
He still retains

custody of the two (2) boys of the parties, age 12 and 17
( Tp . 2 5 , 4 5) .
On February 15, 1983 Defendant filed an Order To Show
Cause requesting that the Decree of Divorce previously
entered be modified (Rp. 19).

She requested that she be

awarded child support for the minor child in her custody;
that Plaintiff be required to reimburse her for certain
monies which she had expended on the child in her custody
prior to the date of the Hearing and that the Decree be
modified to require the Plaintiff to pay to Defendant her
equity in the family home upon his remarriage.

The Pl

filed a Counter Affidavit asking for a Judgm<Cnt

f"r

dJ ,,t_

, i t 1·

in child support and an increase of support for the tw,,
minor children in his custody (Rp. 25).

-5The matter came on for Hearing on the 11th day of March

JYRJ and the Court, after hearing the testimony of the
~,1rt1es,

ordered that the Plaintiff be granted Judgment for

back child support in the amount of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY
FIVE ($875.00) DOLLARS; that the cost of care of the child
in Defendant's custody and the oldest son in Plaintiff's
custody off-set each other and, therefore, cancelled each
other out; reduced the support required to be paid by the
Defendant for the other minor child in Plaintiff's custody
to SEVENTY FIVE ($75.00)

DOLLARS per month and further ruled

that there was no change in circumstances sufficient to cause
a change in the Decree relating to payment of equity in the
home to the Defendant (Rp. 31 - 36).
From the Court's Order the Appellant took this Appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court abused its discretion in finding

that there were no substantial and material change in
circumstances sufficient to modify the property settlement
agreement.
2.
to

Whether the Court abused its discretion in refusing

require Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for the expenses

ur child care she incurred while the minor child was in her
( li:-;t(!dy

prior to Hearing.

-GARGUMENT
I .

THE COURT DID NOT ABllSJ: ITS DlSCHETllJN TN
RULING THAT THERE WAS NU CHANGE: IN C lHCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO ,JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AS lNCURPORATED IN THE DECREE.

At the outset, it should be noted that the burden is
on the Appellant to prove that evidence clearly prepondeer.,t.
against the findings as made, and that there was a misundr·rstanding or misapplication of law resulting in substantial
prejudicial error, or that serious inequity has resulted "
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
Mitchell, Utah, 527 P2d 1359 (1974).

Mitchell vs.

----

The Mitchell Court

we<

on to say that in divorce actions, the trial Court has
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial
property interests, and its actions are indulged with a
presumption of validity; and that the court's determinatio:1,
based on the Courts review of the facts and circumstancos,
should not be overturned unless it results in such manifest
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of
discretion. Mitchell vs. Mitchell, supra, at pagu 1360.
In Despain vs. Despain, Utah, 610 P2d 1303 (April 11,
1980), the Supreme Court stated as follows:
That in both the formulation of a Divurcc Deer ·
and any modifications thereof, the Tr i.il Cou rl 1'
vested with broad discrel1ondry l'ow0rs wil1c·h 111.1·,
disturbed by the appelL:ite Court only rn tile: 11·
of a clear abuse thereof.
Paqu 1305
The Court went on to say that in the c1bsencec
compelling equitable cons1derat1ons,

the tc·rms

•<I

"!
,1

prurc

-7settlement arc not be abrogated.
,11

Despain vs. Despain, supra,

l'"'l'' 130G.

There is no question that under State Law the Court has
~untinuing

jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or

new orders with respect to the distribution of property as
shall be reasonable and necessary.

UCA, 1953, Section 30-

3-5.
The Courts in interpreting State Law have stated that
in order to provide some stability to decrees, and to prevent
an inundation of the Courts with Petitions For Modification,
a party seeking a modification must demonstrate a substantial
change of circumstances and that the change in circumstances
required to justify a modification of a Divorce Decree varies
with the type of modification sought.
Utah, 657 P2d 757,

Haslam vs. Haslam,

(1982); Christensen vs. Christensen, Utah,

G28 P2d 1297 (1981)
As here, in the case of modification of a Decree
involving real property, the Court should be reluctant to
grant modification of the provisions of the Divorce Decree
which dispose of real property and grant such modifications
only upon a showing of compelling reasons arriving from
substantial and material changes in circumstances.
vc.o.

F_oulge_r, Utah, 626 P2d 412 (1981);

Foulger

(emphasis supplied).

'I'll<' Courl has also said that property settlements, when
'"' '" purated into the Decree of Divorce, are entitled to a
'llcdt,,r

s,rnctity than alimony and support payments in

-8-

proceedings to modify Decrees; and that thcr0 aunn1c1l1"r 1
should only be resorted tu with
compelling reasons.

Land vs.

1

1n.J1tr'ltJc'\111,·,

Lar1_1l,

111,th, b05

!

1

•1<

.'d

1

1

t

lii~,

(19 80) .

In the matter here before the Court the evidence si"''"'"
that the Defendant entered into the Property Settlement
Agreement knowingly, that she read it and apparently
understood it ( Tp.

9) •

The records showed that she worked

at Hill Air Force Base for four

(4) years prior to the

divorce as an audit manager and dealt with people and was
in charge of certain responsibilities (Tp. 33).

She wcls

to dealing with people and handling her own affairs.

u;c

At

time did she allege that she had been mislead or did nut
understand the provisions of the Settlement Agreement.
The only question to be decided by the Court was whetc!
the fact that her daughter had come to live with her and
remarriage and that of the Plaintiff were such as to
constitute a substantial and material change in circwnstar"_·,
such as to justify a modification of Decree.
The record points out that the Defendant voluntar1li
left her husband and her children and her stable home t"
continue a relationship which started at her work and er,Ji_,
in her marriage to the individual who is hL·r prc·s• n1

ll 1 1

( Tp. 3 0, 31) .
Plaintiff remained with the part icos' childr"11

""!

continued to provide them with a stablc home clnd humc J

11

1

-9-

a11d still h"s custody of two
,·h1ld1,c·n (T['
lwl'

45).

(2) of the parties' three (3)

All of the circumstances upon which the

ncJ.·rnt rc.·1 ico; lo justify a modification of the Decree were

tn a large extent created by the Defendant, of her own
choice, and one which could be easily contemplated by her
at the time the Agreement was made.
In a recent case decided by this Court, the Court
refused to modify a Decree with terms very similar to those
before the Court where the equity from the home was to be
distributed to the Defendant upon sale.

Defendant requested

modification of the Decree to provide for payment upon
remarriage.

The Defendant argued if she had been represented

by counsel, the Decree would have provided for equity
distribution on remarriage of the Plaintiff.

The Supreme

Court, in upholding the lower Court's decision not to modify
the Decree, stated that the threshhold requirement for relief
is a showing of a substantial change in circumstances of the
parties occurring since the entry of the Decree and not
contemplated by the parties.
1213,

Lea vs. Bowers, Utah, 658 P2d,

(1983).

In the matter here before the Court, the Court ruled
lhal there was nu showing of a substantial change of
,.

1

1 ,·1unstdr1L.l'S Jnci
•• 1.

1

th3.t since there is no such showing,

the

s tee; 1uLlical.::i (Pp. 33).

Th« '-"•u1

t

n1• ·di 1 iL·at ion uf

w.1s JUStified in ruling that the question of

Decree in regards to property settlement was

-10res judicata based on its findings thut thc;rc were tic' ,-i-,,
circumstances.
Smith vs. Smith,

McLane vs.
Utuh,

Based upon the

Utah,

~Lane,

564 Pld JO/,

furL"qu1rFJ

and

570 P2d G92,

I'

(l'J77)

tht: circumstanc1_s ('t

t

case, there is no substantial und materiul chc.rngc in
circumstances such as to justify the modification of

th~

Decree as to property settlement and the Court in so rul1
did not abuse its discretion.
ARGUMENT
I I.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO
REIMBURSE THE DEFENDANT FOR EXPENSES OF
CHILD CARE SHE INCURRED WHILE THE MINOR
WAS IN HER CUSTODY PRIOR TO HEARING
Again it should be pointed out that the Judgment of
Trial Court in determining the question of child support
should be given considerable difference due to the Triul
Court's advantaged position and should not be disturbed
unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary,
or the Trial Court abuses its discretion or misapplies
principals of law.
P2d 1297,

Christensen vs. Christensen,

Utah, G"'

(1981); Fletcher vs. Fletcher, Utah, 615

P~d

L'.:

( 1980) .
The law is clear thut both parents have an

ubliq~t1

to support their children, UCA Section 78-45-3 dncl lo4; however,

it is equully clear that <'nforccmc•11t

support obligation in domestic relations m.1ttcrs i.1tc·"'

-11-

tho L·untcxt uf

Motion To Modify A Decree are governed by

0

sc.·t iun J0-3-S, UCA, and not by the provision of the Uniform
'1·•il L1c1bility For Support Act set forth in Chapter 45 of

1tl1

78, UCA.

Mecham vs. Mecham, Utah, 570 P2d 123,

(1977)

All of the cases cited by the Defendant in regards to
Lhc obligation of a parent to support his or her child arose
in the context of the State seeking reimbursement for funds
expended on behalf of a child of the parent.

Not as here,

in the context of a parent having custody of one child
seeking rcimbursment from a parent who had custody of the
parties' other two (2) children.
The Defendant readily admitted that the cost of
supporting each of the two (2) children in Plaintiff's
custody greatly exceeded her ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR ($100.00)
per month per child contribution (Tp. 35).
Defendant admitted that she expended considerable sums
of money for clothing (Tp. 32), hair care (Tp. 23), allowance
(Tp.

24) and other activities for the daughter in her care,

totaling approximately FIFTEEN to SIXTEEN HUNDRED DOLLARS
($1, Sl!O. 00 to $1, GOO. 00)

(Tp. 25).

Plaintiff stated that

he could not afford those kinds of expenditures for the child
(Tp.
tlk
1

46, 47) and that his income had gone down some since
ncc,·rc<c

\,111"

II·

\·Us

1111t~lll<l:ll

l• ,;t

,•ntcrcd (Tp. 43), and that his take-home was
T\vENT'i T\'10 DOLLARS ($1,222.00) per month (Tp.

11 H·d

tll.1t the two (2) boys who continue to

-12reside with him were now 11 years old and 1 7 yc·"rs old
respectively and the cxpendi Lun·s
steadily as they had grown 11ldc·1

t ,-,

Ll

(Tp.

i ,,,. t hc·m h icl

cJG).

lie

''".

lL'c;t it 1._c!

he had remarried and that his wife made approximately
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000.00)

per year

(TfJ. 51).

The record further shows that the Defendant was full;
employed with a regular income

(Tp. 18) and that her prescc

husband has an annual income of approximately THIRTY FOUR
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($34,000.00)

and that there was only one

(1) child in their home, that being the daughter of the
parties'

(Tp.

52).

The facts presented show that Defendant did spend
approximately FIFTEEN HUNDRED DOLLARS ($1,500.00)
on her daughter over a nine

(9) month period.

The same

daughter who, along with her two sons and husband,
left for her present husband

(Rp. 32)

she hJd

in 1981.

The monies she expended on the child,

to sooth her n1-::·

conscience or for whatever purpose, were not alone for
necessities and were greatly in excess of what would have
been spent had the daughter remained with her father

(Tp.

46) .

It is important to note that the Decree specificallv
provided that the Defendant pay support for her cl<n1qhtu
the amount of ONE HUNDRED DULLl\HS ($100.00) !'»l mr•ntJ,
11-13).

This Order had not bL'cn m<ldifi<·d u1

the Court and,

therefore, was still in effect.

1

'IL1n·1• ,;

This

h'd :~

-13-

a case where no support order had been entered as stated by
the

Defendant so as to invoke the provision of Section 78-

4'J- 7 UCA.

The record shows that Plaintiff continues to have
custody and care for the two (2) minor sons of the parties'
and expenses have continued to increase (Tp. 46) and that
he continues to pay debts and obligations remaining from the
marriage of the parties (Tp. 51) on an income which has
diminished somewhat since the time of the Decree (Tp. 43).
From the foregoing it is clear that the Court in light
of the circumstances did not abuse its discretion or misapply
any principal of law in refusing to require the Plaintiff
to reimburse Defendant for monies spent on the child in her
custody prior to the time of Hearing.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court in refusing to modify the
Property Settlement Agreement incorporated into the Decree
and refusing to order Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for
money spent on the child in her custody up to the day of
Hearing was supported by the evidence and should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of September,

A.D., 1983.
HESS, VAN WAGENEN, PAGE & HESS

Attorney
Plaintiff-Respondent
40 South 125 East
Clearfield, UT 84015
Telephone No: (801) 825-2225
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to Edward B. Havas, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 3293
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